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Abstract
U.S. CPS data indicate that in recessions firms actually increase their hiring rates
from the pools of the unemployed and out of the labor force. Why so? The paper
provides an explanation by studying the optimal recruiting behavior of the rep-
resentative firm. The model combines labor frictions, of the search and matching
type, with capital frictions, of the q-model type.
Optimal firm behavior is a function of the value of jobs, i.e., the expected present
value of themarginal worker to the firm. These are estimated to be counter-cyclical,
the underlying reason being the dynamic behavior of the labor share of GDP. The
counter-cyclicality of hiring rates and job values, whichmay appear counter-intuitive,
is shown to be consistent with well-known business cycle facts. The analysis em-
phasizes the difference between current labor productivity and the wider, forward-
looking concept of job values.
The paper explains the high volatility of firm recruiting behavior, as well as the
reduction over time in labor market fluidity in the U.S., using the same estimated
model. Part of the explanation has to do with job values and another part with the
interaction of hiring and investment costs, both determinants having been typically
overlooked.
Key words: counter-cyclical job values, business cycles, aggregate hiring, , vacan-
cies, labor market frictions, capital market frictions, volatility, labor market fluidity.
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Aggregate Hiring and the Value of Jobs Along the Business Cycle1
1 Introduction
The paper asks what governs the representative firm hiring behavior along the busi-
ness cycle. This behavior is important for our understanding of business cycles and
employment dynamics. The literature on this topic has devoted an enormous amount
of attention, for over a decade, to the ability of models to account for the high volatility
of job vacancies and unemployment, and has paid much less attention to the counter-
cyclicality of the hiring rate from non-employment observed in U.S. data. This paper
shows that a model combining labor frictions, of the search and matching type, with
capital frictions, of the q-model type, can account for both the high volatility of job
vacancy rates and the counter-cyclicality of hiring rates from non-employment. The
results of estimation are shown to be consistent with well-known business cycle facts,
such as pro-cyclical employment and pro-cyclical vacancy and job-finding rates, as well
as job to job flows. The analysis emphasizes the difference between the behavior of cur-
rent labor productivity and the wider, forward-looking concept of job value.
I look at the optimality equation of the firm, which equates the marginal cost of
worker recruitment and the expected present value of the worker for the firm, i.e., the
job value. I estimate alternative specifications of the equation. Estimation rests on
key formulations in the literature, particularly the ones related to search and matching
and investment q models. Following estimation, I analyze the cyclical behavior and
volatility of job values and of the recruiting variables.
The main findings are as follows:
(i) Job values are counter-cyclical in U.S. data. This key finding means that in re-
cessions the value of jobs for firms goes up. Note that this value is a forward-looking
expected present value of future labor profitability.
(ii) Correspondingly, hiring rates from non-employment (unemployment + out of
the labor force) are counter-cyclical: it is worthwhile for firms to increase hiring rates
as job values rise in recessions.
(iii) While the afore-mentioned hiring rates are counter-cyclical, vacancy rates and
hiring rates from employment (i.e., job to job flows) are pro-cyclical. The differences
1I am grateful to Larry Christiano and Giuseppe Moscarini for very useful discussions; to seminar partcipants at
the Dale Mortensen memorial conference (Aarhus, October 2014) and at the CEPR ESSIM conference (Tarragona,
May 2015) for useful feedback; and to Avihai Lifschitz, Andrey Perlin and Ziv Usha for excellent research assistance.
Any errors are my own.
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between points (ii) and (iii) are explained.
(iv)While point (i), the counter-cyclicality of job values, may appear counter-intuitive,
it is consistent with the findings of recent studies looking at the cyclical behavior of the
labor share in GDP. It is the dynamic behavior of the labor share that engenders the
counter-cyclicality of the forward-looking job values.
(v) Points (i) and (ii) do not contradict what we already know about the cyclical
features of the labor market, including pro-cyclical employment job finding rates, and
wages.
(vi) Moving from cyclicality to volatility, the high volatility of vacancy and hiring
rates is explained within the same framework. Part of the explanation has to do with
job values and another part with the interaction of recruitment behavior with capital
investment behavior. Both determinants have been typically overlooked.
(vii) The secular phenomenon of a reduction in labor market fluidity in the U.S.
over time, noted by Davis and Haltiwanger (2014), is also accounted for, using the
same framework.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the context of the paper in the lit-
erature. Section 3 presents the model and the key relations to be examined empirically.
Section 4 studies the cyclical behavior of the key data series. The data and methodol-
ogy are elaborated in Section 5, followed by the results of estimation in Section 6. The
cyclical implications of the results are elaborated in Section 7. Section 8 elaborates on
the connections of the results to the cyclicality of the labor share in GDP, recently dis-
cussed in other Macro contexts. Section 9 studies the volatility of the recruitment series
(vacancy and hiring rates) and relates them to the estimated job values. In Section 10
I use this framework to explain the decline in U.S. labor market fluidity. Section 11
concludes. Derivations and other technical matters are relegated to appendices.
2 The Paper in the Context of the Literature
This paper focuses on the firms’ optimal recruiting behavior in the presence of frictions
in an aggregate context along the business cycle. To see how recent literature has ap-
proached this topic, it may be useful to discuss this behavior using the following simple
equation:
MCt() = EtPVt() (1)
The equation relates the marginal costs of vacancies or of hiring which the firm faces
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with the marginal benefit, which is the expected present value of what the firm will get
from the employment relationship. In search and matching models this is usually the
free entry condition. Table 1 lists 13 key studies and reports what these studies have
posited with respect to the LHS and the RHS of equation (1). Appendix A presents the
full equation as formulated by each study. The studies are divided into two groups –
those positing linear costs and those positing convex costs.
Table 1
Beyond the differences between linear and convex costs, the table shows that the
different permutations of formulating the equation include:
(i) Single job vs large firms.
(ii) Using vacancies or actual hires as arguments of the cost function.
(iii) Formulating labor only or capital and labor as determining productivity.
(iv) Wages (appearing on the RHS) being determined by the Nash solution, in-
trafirm bargaining, credible bargaining or sticky wage mechanisms.
(v) Worker separations modeled as exogenous or endogenous, constant or stochas-
tic.
(vi) Discounting the future with a constant or time-varying rate; for the latter, there
are different formulations (IMRS, WACC or derived from the stock market).
The current paper looks at a number of alternative specifications. The key one has
large firms and convex costs; takes into account both vacancies and actual hires as ar-
guments of the cost function; includes capital as well as labor; models capital adjust-
ment frictions as well as labor frictions; uses actual wages and separation rates, without
explicitly modelling how they are determined; and uses a time-varying IMRS-type dis-
count rate. The idea is to structurally estimate this equation (and any accompanying
one) in order to explore the cyclicality and volatility of aggregate recruitment behavior.
In previous work – Merz and Yashiv (2007) and Yashiv (2016) – I have also used this
formulation, or special cases of it.
The former paper did so in the context of studying the determinants of the market
value of U.S. firms. The idea there is that the value of investment and the value of hiring
make up the value of the firm. That paper thus focuses onmatching stockmarket values
and uses relevant financial data in estimation. The current paper does not deal at all
with stock market issues and does not use financial data.
The latter paper uses the formulation above to analyze the joint, forward-looking
behavior of hiring and investment. It looks at their inter-relationships and the deter-
minants of their inter-connected present values. It takes a Finance-like approach in
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treating job values and capital values akin to stock prices. The empirical work is a
VAR forecast analysis which allows for the determination of the relative importance of
various variables in accounting for these “stock prices.” Hence it decomposes job and
capital values into “dividend” and “discounting” components, as the Finance literature
does.
The current paper focuses on job values only and the key issue is firm recruiting
behavior over the business cycle. In particular, the current paper (i) explores the cycli-
cal behavior of the key series related to recruiting; (ii) relates job value behavior to the
labor share over the cycle; (iii) explores the relationship between the different recruit-
ing series – vacancy rates and two hiring rate series – and job values along the cycle;
(iv) shows that the standard search and matching model is not able to account for the
cyclical patterns; (v) shows how the current model explains the high volatility of the
recruitment rates; (vi) studies the secular decline in labor market fluidity, including
recruiting.
Thus, the reader learns different lessons: Merz and Yashiv (2007) show that stock
prices/values of firms depend on capital and job values and quantify these relations.
Yashiv (2016) shows the complementarity between the hiring and investment processes;
the important cross effects of the value of capital on the mean and the volatility of the
hiring rate, and vice versa; and that future returns play a dominant role in determining
capital and job values. The current paper shows that hiring rates from non-employment
are counter-cyclical, following the counter-cyclicality of job values; it shows that the
underlying reason is the dynamic behavior of the labor share of GDP; and that while
this counter-cyclicality may appear counter-intuitive, it is consistent with well-known
business cycle facts; and it shows that the same model can account for high volatility
and the secular decline of the recruiting variables.
3 The Model
I present a model of firm optimization, which includes capital as well as labor, and
formulate the costs function underlying the problem in such a way that the cases shown
in Table 1 above will mostly be special cases.
3.1 The General Model
Set-Up. There are identical workers and identical firms, who live forever and have
rational expectations.
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Worker Flows. Consider worker flows. The flow from non-employment – unemploy-
ment (U) and out of the labor force (O) – to employment, E, is to be denoted OE+UE
and the separation flow in the opposite direction, EU + EO. Worker flows within em-
ployment – i.e., job to job flows – are to be denoted EE.
I shall denote:
h
n
=

h1
n

+

h2
n

(2)
h1
n
=
OE+UE
E
;
h2
n
=
EE
E
Hence h1 and h2 denote flows from non-employment and from other employment,
respectively, and n is employment.
Separation rates are given in an analogous way by:
ψ = ψ1 + ψ2 (3)
ψ1 =
EO+ EU
E
; ψ2 =
EE
E
=
h2
n
Employment dynamics are thus given by:
nt+1 = (1  ψ1t   ψ2t )nt + h1t + h2t (4)
= (1  ψt)nt + ht, 0  ψt  1
h2t = ψ
2
t nt
Matching and Separations.2 Firms hire from non-employment (h1t ) and from other
firms (h2t ). Each period, the worker’s effective units of labor (normally 1 per person)
depreciate to 0, in the current firm, with some exogenous probability ψt. Thus, the
match suffers an irreversible idiosyncratic shock that makes it no longer viable. The
worker may be reallocated to a new firm where his/her productivity is (temporarily)
restored to 1. This happens with a probability of ψ2t . Those who are not reallocated
join unemployment, with probability ψ1t = ψt   ψ2t . So the fraction ψ2t that enters job
to job flows depends on the endogenous hiring flow h2t . The firm decides how many
vacancies vt to open and, given job filling rates (q1t , q
2
t ), will get to hire from the pre-
2I am indebted to Giuseppe Moscarini for very useful suggestions to this sub-section.
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existing non-employed and from the pool of matches just gone sour. The job-filling or
matching rates satisfy:
q1t =
h1t
vt
; q2t =
h2t
vt
; qt = q1t + q
2
t
Firms Optimization. Firms make gross investment (it) and vacancy (vt) decisions.
Once a new worker is hired, the firm pays him or her a per-period wage wt. Firms
use physical capital (kt) and labor (nt) as inputs in order to produce output goods yt
according to a constant-returns-to-scale production function f with productivity shock
zt:
yt = f (zt,nt, kt), (5)
Gross hiring and gross investment are subject to frictions, spelled out below, and
hence are costly activities. I represent these costs by a function g[it, kt, vt, ht, nt] which
is convex in the firm’s decision variables (it, vt,) and exhibits constant returns-to-scale,
allowing hiring costs and investment costs to interact.
In every period t, the capital stock depreciates at the rate δt and is augmented by
new investment it. Similarly, workers separate at the rate ψt and the employment stock
is augmented by new hires qtvt = ht. The laws of motion are:
kt+1 = (1  δt)kt + it, 0  δt  1. (6)
nt+1 = (1  ψt)nt + qtvt, 0  ψt  1 (7)
The representative firm chooses sequences of it and vt in order to maximize its prof-
its as follows:
max
fit+j,vt+jg
Et
∞
∑
j=0
 
j
∏
i=0
ρt+i
!
(1  τt+j)
 
f (zt+j,nt+j, kt+j)  g
 
it+j, kt+j, vt+j, ht+j, nt+j

 wt+jnt+j  

1  χt+j   τt+jDt+j
 epIt+j it+j
!
(8)
subject to the constraints (6) and (7), where τt is the corporate income tax rate, wt is
the wage, χt the investment tax credit, Dt the present discounted value of capital de-
preciation allowances, p˜It the real pre-tax price of investment goods, and ρt+j is a time-
varying discount factor. The firm takes the paths of the variables qt,wt,ψt, epIt , δt, τt and
ρt as given. This is consistent with the standard models in the search and matching and
Tobin’s q literatures. The Lagrange multipliers associated with these two constraints
are denoted QKt+j and Q
N
t+j, respectively. These Lagrange multipliers can be interpreted
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as marginalQ for physical capital, andmarginalQ for employment, respectively. I shall
use the term capital value or present value of investment for the former and job value
or present value of hiring for the latter.
The first-order conditions for dynamic optimality are:3
QKt = Et
h
ρt+1
h
(1  τt+1)
 
fkt+1   gkt+1

+ (1  δt+1)QKt+1
ii
(9)
QKt = (1  τt)

git + p
I
t

(10)
QNt = Et
h
ρt+1
h
(1  τt+1) ( fnt+1   gnt+1   wt+1) +
 
1  ψt+1

QNt+1
ii
(11)
QNt = (1  τt)
gvt
qt
(12)
Using these equations, the following expression captures the RHS of equation (1),
the present value of the job to the firm:
PVt = ρt+1 (1  τt+1)
"
fnt+1   gnt+1   wt+1
+(1  ψt+1)
gvt+1
qt+1
#
(13)
Basically PVt is the present value of the profit flows from the marginal worker fnt+j  
gnt+j   wt+j for j = 1...∞ adjusted for taxes (τt+j) and separation rates (ψt+j).
I can summarize the firm’s first-order necessary conditions from equations (9)-(12)
by the following two expressions:
(1  τt)

git + p
I
t

= Et
"
ρt,t+1 (1  τt+1)
"
fkt+1   gkt+1
+(1  δt+1)(git+1 + pIt+1)
##
(14)
(1  τt) gvtqt = Et
"
ρt,t+1 (1  τt+1)
"
fnt+1   gnt+1   wt+1
+(1  ψt+1)
gvt+1
qt+1
##
(15)
Equation (15) is at the focal point of the analysis and gives structure to equation
(1) above. Following the explicit formulation of the costs function g I shall consider
alternative, specific cases. Equation (14) is estimated jointly with equation (15). The
estimating equations are spelled out in Appendix B.
The costs function g, capturing the different frictions in the hiring and investment
3where I use the real after-tax price of investment goods, given by:
pIt+j =
1  χt+j   τt+jDt+j
1  τt+j
epIt+j.
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processes, is at the focus of the estimation work. Specifically, hiring costs include costs
of advertising, screening and testing, matching frictions, training costs and more. In-
vestment involves implementation costs, financial premia on certain projects, capital
installation costs, learning the use of new equipment, etc. Both activities may involve,
in addition to production disruption, the implementation of new organizational struc-
tures within the firm and new production techniques.4 In sum g is meant to capture all
the frictions involved in getting workers to work and capital to operate in production,
and not, say, just capital adjustment costs or vacancy costs. One should keep in mind
that this is formulated as the costs function of the representative firm within a macro-
economic model, and not one of a single firm in a heterogenous firms micro set-up.
Functional Form. The parametric form I use is the following, generalized convex
function.
g() =
26664
e1
η1
( itkt )
η1
+ e2η2
h
(1 λ1 λ2)vt+λ1q1t vt+λ2q2t vt
nt
iη2
+ e31η31

it
kt
q1t vt
nt
η31
+ e32η32

it
kt
q2t vt
nt
η32
37775 f (zt, nt, kt). (16)
The basic idea is of a convex function of the rates of activity – investment ( itkt )
and recruiting ( (1 λ1 λ2)vt+λ1h
1
t+λ2h
2
t
nt ). This function is linearly homogenous in its ar-
guments i, k, v, h, n. The parameters el , l = 1, 2, 31, 32 express scale, and the parameters
η1, η2, η31, η32 express the convexity of the costs function with respect to its different ar-
guments. λ1 is the weight in the cost function assigned to hiring from non-employment
( h
1
t
nt ), λ2 is the weight assigned to hiring from other firms (
h2t
nt ), and (1  λ1   λ2) is the
weight assigned to vacancy ( vtnt ) costs. The weights λ1 and λ2 are thus related to the
training and production disruption aspects, while the complementary weight is related
to the vacancy creation aspect. The last two terms in square brackets capture interac-
tions between investment and hiring. For these it differentiates between interaction of
hiring from employment and those of hiring from non-employment. When a parameter
is estimated, there is no constraint placed on its sign or magnitude.
I rationalize the use of this form in what follows.
Background Literature. The adjustment costs function considered here is an out-
growth of a long series of papers. In the early literature, Nadiri and Rosen (1969)
considered interrelated factor demand functions for labor and capital with adjustment
costs. Lucas (1967) and Mortensen (1973) derived firm optimal behavior with convex
adjustment costs for n factors of production. It is of interest to note Mortensen’s sum-
4See Alexopoulos (2011) and Alexopoulos and Tombe (2012).
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mary of Lucas in his footnote 4 (p. 659), stating that “Adjustment costs arise in the view
of Lucas either because installation and planning involves the use of internal resources
or because the firm is a monopsonist in its factor markets. Since Lucas rules out the
possibility of interaction with the production process, the costs are either the value of
certain perfectly variable resources used exclusively in the planning and installation
processes or the premium which the firm must pay in order to obtain the factors at
more rapid rates.” Lucas and Prescott (1971) embedded these convex adjustment costs
in a stochastic industry equilibrium.
A recent theoretical and empirical literature has given more foundations to the
investment-hiring interaction terms and the different hiring terms used here. This new
literature looks at the connections between investment in capital, the hiring of work-
ers, and organizational and management changes. A general discussion and overview
of this line of research is offered by Ichniowsky and Shaw (2013) and by Lazear and
Oyer (2013). One specific example is provided by Bartel, Ichniowski and Shaw (2007),
who study the effects of new information technologies (IT) on productivity. They use
data on plants in one narrowly defined industry, valve manufacturing. Their empirical
analysis reveals, inter alia, that adoption of new IT-enhanced capital equipment coin-
cides with increases in the skill requirements of machine operators, notably technical
and problem-solving skills, and with the adoption of new human resource practices
to support these skills. They show how investment in capital equipment has a variety
of effects on hiring and on training, some of them contradictory. Hence, in the cur-
rent context, investment and hiring interactions are relevant and could have positive or
negative signs. Another example is provided by a study of a large hospital system by
Bartel, Beaulieu, Phibbs, and Stone (2014). They find that the arrival of a new nurse is
associated with lowered productivity. This effect is significant only if the nurse is hired
externally; hence there is reason to make a distinction between job to job movements
and hiring from non-employment.
Arguments of the function. This specification captures the idea that frictions or costs
increase with the extent of the activity in question – vacancy creation, hiring and in-
vestment. This needs to be modelled relative to the size of the firm. The intuition is
that hiring 10 workers, for example, means different levels of hiring activity for firms
with 100 workers or for firms with 10,000 workers. Hence firm size, as measured by
its physical capital stock or its level of employment, is taken into account and the costs
function is increasing in the vacancy, hiring and investment rates, vn ,
h
n and
i
k . The func-
tion used postulates that costs are proportional to output, i.e., the results can be stated
in terms of lost output.
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More specifically, the terms in the function presented above may be justified as fol-
lows (drawing on Garibaldi and Moen (2009)): suppose each worker i makes a recruit-
ing and training effort hi; as this is to be modelled as a convex function, it is optimal to
spread out the efforts equally across workers so hi = hn ; formulating the costs as a func-
tion of these efforts and putting them in terms of output per worker one gets c

h
n

f
n ;
as n workers do it then the aggregate cost function is given by c

h
n

f .
Convexity. I use a convex function. While non-convexities were found to be signif-
icant at the micro level (plant, establishment, or firm), a number of recent papers have
given empirical support for the use of a convex function in the aggregate, showing that
such a formulation is appropriate at the macroeconomic level.5
Interaction. The terms e31η31

it
kt
q1t vt
nt
η31
and e32η32

it
kt
q2t vt
nt
η32
express the interaction of in-
vestment and hiring costs. They allow for a different interaction for hires from non-
employment (h1t ) and from other firms (h
2
t ). These terms, absent in many studies, have
important implications for the complementarity of investment and hiring.
3.2 Alternative Specifications
Beyond the general model spelled out above, which nests most of the specifications of
Table 1, I specifically examine two special cases.
3.2.1 Tobin’s q Approach
As shown in the second group of studies in Table 1 above, there is a formulation of opti-
mal hiring with convex costs following the logic of the literature on investment models,
mostly the seminal contributions of Lucas and Prescott (1971) and of Tobin (1969) and
Hayashi (1982). This approach ignores the other factor of production (i.e., assumes no
adjustment costs for it). In the current case, investment in capital is assumed to have
no adjustment costs. Typically quadratic costs are posited (for vacancies and hiring).
Hence in this case e1 = e31 = e32 = 0 and η2 = 2. The optimality equation becomes:
5Thus, Thomas (2002) and Kahn and Thomas (2008, see in particular their discussion on pages 417-421)
study a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium model with nonconvex capital adjustment costs. One
key idea which emerges from their analysis is that there are smoothing effects that result from equilibrium
price changes. House (2014) shows that even though neoclassical investment models are inconsistent
with micro data, they capture the relevant aggregate investment dynamics embodied in models with fixed
investment adjustment costs. On page 99 he states that “This finding is highly robust and explains why
researchers working in the DSGE tradition have found little role for fixed costs in numerical trials.” This is
due to the “The near-infinite elasticity of intertemporal substitution (which) eliminates virtually any role
for microeconomic heterogeneity in governing investment demand.”
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(1  τt) e2qt
"
(1  λ1   λ2)
+λ1q1t + λ2q
2
t
#2
vt
nt
= Et
1
ft
nt
"
ρt,t+1 (1  τt+1)
"
fnt+1   gnt+1   wt+1
+(1  ψt+1)
gvt+1
qt+1
##
(17)
3.2.2 The Standard Search and Matching Model
The standard search and matching model does not consider investment when formu-
lating costs and refers to linear vacancy costs. It refers to vacancies only (not to hiring).
In terms of the model above it has e1 = e31 = e32 = 0,λ1 = λ2 = 0 and η2 = 1. It
thus formulates the optimality equation for vacancy creation (vt) as follows, i.e., this is
equation (15) for this particular model.
(1  τt) e2qt
ft
nt
= Et

ρt+1 (1  τt+1)

fnt+1   wt+1 + (1  ψt+1)
e2
qt+1
ft+1
nt+1

(18)
As shown in the first group of studies in Table 1 above, and further discussed in
Appendix A, this is a prevalent formulation, that has total costs be a linear function
of vacancies, i.e., e2qt
ft
nt vt whereby the cost is proportional to labor productivity
ft
nt and
depends on the average duration of the vacancy 1qt (qt is the job filling rate, qt =
ht
vt ).
4 The Cyclical Behavior of Vacancy and Hiring Rates
Before turning to estimation, it is worthwhile to briefly examine the cyclical behavior of
each of the data series themselves: hiring rates ( h
1
t
nt ) from non-employment (unemploy-
ment + OLF); hiring rates ( h
2
t
nt ) from employment (i.e., job to job flows); and vacancy
rates ( vtnt ). I consider each in turn.
4.1 Hiring from Non-Employment
I compute ρ( h
1
t
nt , ft+i)where h
1
t is the CPS gross hiring flow from the pool of unemploy-
ment plus out of the labor force and ft+i is Non Financial Corporate Business Sector
(NFCB) GDP, in logged, HP filtered terms (see Appendix C for data definitions and
sources).
Table 2 and Figure 1
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Hiring rates from non-employment are counter-cyclical. This fact has been noted by
Blanchard and Diamon (1990), Elsby, Michaels, and Solon (2009), and Shimer (2012).
4.2 Job to Job Flows
I repeat the same computation for job to job flows i.e., ρ( h
2
t
nt , ft+i) where h
2
t is the CPS
gross job to job flows, based on the work of Fallick and Fleischmann (2004), which was
updated till 2013 (see Appendix C). The sample here starts in 1994.
Table 3 and Figure 2
Job to job flows, i.e., hiring rates from employment, are pro-cyclical. This is well-
known; see, for example, the discussion in Fallick and Fleischmann (2004).
4.3 Vacancy Rates
I repeat the same computation for vacancy rates i.e., ρ( vtnt , ft+i) where vt is the adjusted
HWI rate, as delineated in the Appendix C.
Table 4 and Figure 3
Vacancy rates are pro-cyclical, as is well-known too (see Barnichon (2012)).
4.4 CPS vs JOLTS Hires Data
When using these worker flows, a natural question that arises concerns the possible use
of JOLTS data. These data are not used here, as they do not allow for the breakdown
of hiring into h1t and h
2
t and are available only from December 2000. Moreover, there
are big differences between CPS and JOLTS data as shown in the following table that
pertains to total hires ht = h1t + h
2
t in the overlapping sample period.
Table 5
The following conclusions emerge from the table: the CPS mean is 1.83 times higher
that the JOLTS mean, the CPS median is 1.81 times higher; the c.o.v of CPS is 0.0587,
about half of c.o.v for JOLTS at 0.10; the third moment is very different; only the fourth
moment is close across the data samples.
Hence one should note that these two data sets yield very different worker flow
series and any comparisons need to be done with care. I do not use JOLTS data here for
the reasons elaborated above.
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4.5 Consistency with Well-Known Facts
The emerging picture from Figures 1-3 and Tables 2-4 is consistent with some well-
known facts. Note that the hiring rate is the product of the job finding rate, the non-
employment rate and the inverse of the employment rate:
h1t
nt|{z}
hiring rate
=
h1t
ut + ot| {z }
job finding
ut + ot
popt| {z }
non-emp
 1nt
popt|{z}
inv emp ratio
(19)
where u is unemployment, o is the out of the labor force pool and pop is the working
age population.
The following table shows the co-movement statistics for these variables.
Table 6
The job finding rate h
1
t
ut+ot is pro-cyclical, as is well known. The latter feature has
been emphasized by Shimer (2012). The non-employment rate ut+otpopt and the inverse of
the employment ratio 1nt
popt
are counter-cyclical, as widely known too. At the same time
the gross hiring rate h
1
t
nt is counter-cyclical, as shown above. The hiring rate is counter-
cyclical as the counter-cyclicality of the last two variables dominates the pro-cyclicality
of the job-finding rate.6
Also note the following. Employment dynamics are given by:
nt+1   nt
nt
=
h1t
nt
  ψ1t (20)
Along the cycle the variables in (20) can be shown as follows:
Figure 4
Evidently, in the shaded NBER-dated recession periods, net employment growth is
negative with separations being higher than hires. At the same time, in cyclical terms,
Figure 5 shows that both rates increase – relative to the HP trend – during recessions,
i.e., both are counter-cyclical.
Figure 5
6In this context the following quote from Shimer (2012, page 145) is pertinent: “Still, it is most impor-
tant point to recognize the differential behavior of the job finding probability and the number of workers
finding jobs;...”
14
5 Methodology and Data
In order to be empirically evaluated, the afore-going optimality equations of the firm
will be estimated. I discuss the data, the estimation methodology and a post-estimation
approximation and variance decomposition.
5.1 Data
The data are quarterly and pertain to the private sector of the U.S. economy. For a large
part of the empirical work reported below the sample period is 1994-2013. The start
date of 1994 is due to the lack of availability of job to job worker flows (h2t ) data prior
to that. For another part of the empirical work, the sample covers 1976-2013 and the
1976 start is due to the availability of credible monthly CPS data, from which the gross
hiring flows (h1t ) series is derived. This longer sample period covers five NBER-dated
recessions, and both sample periods include the Great Recession (2007-2009) and its
aftermath (2009-2013). The data include NIPA data on the NFCB GDP and its deflator,
capital, investment, the price of investment goods and depreciation, BLS CPS data on
employment and on worker flows, and Fed data computations on tax and depreciation
allowances. Appendix C elaborates on the sources and on data construction. These
data have the following distinctive features: (i) they pertain to the U.S. private sector;
(ii) both hiring ht and investment it refer to gross flows; likewise, separation of workers
ψt and depreciation of capital δt are gross flows; (iii) the estimating equations take into
account taxes and depreciation allowances. Table 7 presents key sample statistics.
Table 7
5.2 Estimation
I use the different model specifications discussed above. For the production function I
use a standard Cobb-Douglas formulation, with productivity shock zt:
f (zt,nt, kt) = eztntαk1 αt , 0 < α < 1. (21)
The costs function g was spelled out above (see equation (16)). Estimation pertains to
the parameters α; e1, e2, e31, e32; η1, η2, η31, η32,λ1,λ2, or to a sub-set of these parameters.
Estimation of the parameters in the production and costs functions allows for the
quantification of the derivatives git and gvt that appear in the firms’ optimality equa-
tions. I structurally estimate the firms’ first-order conditions – equation (15) and the as-
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sociated equation (14) – usingHansen’s (1982) generalizedmethod ofmoments (GMM).
The moment conditions estimated are those obtained under rational expectations. I re-
port the J-statistic test of the over-identifying restrictions. I formulate the equations
in stationary terms by dividing the investment equation by ftkt and the vacancy/hiring
equation by ftnt . Appendix B spells out the first derivatives included in these equations
and the estimating equations. Importantly, I check whether the estimated g function
fulfills the convexity requirement.
Note that the ideal case would be unconstrained estimation of the power parame-
ters η1, η2, η31, η32, of the scale parameters e1, e2, e31 and e32, and of the weights included
in the second term, capturing recruiting, λ1 and λ2. Attempting to do that, the estima-
tion procedure did not converge. Hence constraints were imposed, and four parame-
ters were freely estimated. Yashiv (2016) tried various configurations of η1, η2, η31, η32
estimation and reported the best ones. Following the results – see Table 2 (page 196) –
the powers were set at η1 = η2 = 2 and η31 = η32 = 1. Note that placing such con-
straints on the powers is quite prevalent; often quadratic costs and linear interactions
are simply assumed. The scale parameters (e1, e2, e31, e32)were freely estimated and are
reported in Table 8 below. As to the parameters λ1 and λ2, the following procedure was
followed: (i) learning from past studies provided restrictions on the parameter space;
and (ii) within this restricted space, fixed values were run and compared. I elaborate
on each of these last two points in turn.
Regarding point (i), micro estimates using Swiss data reported in Blatter et al (2016,
Table 1) and structural macro estimates using U.S. data in Furlanetto and Groshenny
(2016, Table 3), Swedish data in Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2011, p.2039), and
Israeli data in Yashiv (2000, Table 2), show that vacancy posting costs are small com-
pared to other components of hiring costs, particularly to training costs. Indeed, Chris-
tiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2011), using Bayesian estimation of a DSGE model of
Sweden, conclude, in this same context, that “employment adjustment costs are a func-
tion of hiring rates, not vacancy posting rates.” These studies then call for a low value
of 1  λ1   λ2. Following them, values of 0  (1  λ1   λ2)  0.3 were examined.
As to point (ii), within the above restricted space, different values of λ1 and λ2 were
tried. Empirical success was judged using the same criteria employed throughout: the
J statistic test, convexity of the costs function (recalling that the second order conditions
depend on the interaction terms), and getting cost estimates that are not large (see the
discussion in Sub-section 6.1 below).
Using these two steps, the values of λ1 = 0.6, λ2 = 0.2 were obtained. A similar
procedure yielded λ = 0.9 in the constrained case (row b of Table 8 below).
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5.3 Post Estimation Approximation and Variance Decomposition
Post estimation I compute an approximated present value, QNt and its variance decom-
position. Iterating forward the RHS of (15) one gets:
PVt =
∞
∑
j=1
266664
 
j
∏
l=1
ρt+l
ft+l
nt+l
ft+l 1
nt+l 1
! 
j
∏
l=2
(1  ψt+l 1)
!  
1  τt+j

"
α  gnt+jft+j
nt+j
  wt+jft+j
nt+j
#
377775 (22)
Following Cochrane (1992), I use the following first-order Taylor expansion to get
(see Appendices D and E for details7):
PVt = Et
"
∞
∑
j=1
exp
"
j
∑
l=1
grt+l
#
exp
"
j
∑
l=1
g ft+l
#
exp
"
j
∑
m=l
gst+m 1
#
MPt+j
#
(23)
where
MPt+j 
 
1  τt+j
0@α  gnt+jft+j
nt+j
  wt+jft+j
nt+j
)
1A (24)
g ft = ln
0@ ft+1nt+1
ft
nt
1A
gst  ln(1  ψt)
grt  ln ρt+1  ln

1
1+ rt

Using a sample period truncated at T, yields the variance decomposition:
7Note, though, that Cochrane (1992) does a second-order rather than a first-order Taylor expansion.
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var(PVt) = Ω
rΩ fE(MP)
1 Ω
T
∑
j=1
(Ω)j 1 cov(PVt, grt+j) + (25)
ΩrΩ fE(MP)
1 Ω
T
∑
j=1
(Ω)j 1 cov(PVt, g
f
t+j) +
ΩrΩ fE(MP)
1 Ω
T
∑
j=2
(Ω)j 1 cov(PVt, gst+j) +
ΩrΩ f
T
∑
j=1
(Ω)j 1 cov(PVt,MPt+j)
where:
Ω f = eE(g
f
t )
Ωs = eE(g
s
t )
Ωr = eE(g
r
t )
Ω = eE(w) = Ω fΩsΩr
wt 

g ft + g
s
t + g
r
t

The variance of job values breaks down into terms relating to future discount rates
(grt+j), productivity growth (g
f
t+j), separation rates (g
s
t+j) and marginal profits (MPt+j).
In what follows I look at the relative size of the different terms on the RHS of equation
(25) in order to gauge their relative importance.
6 Results
I present GMM estimates of equations (14) and (15) under the alternative specifications
described above. Subsequently I use the estimates to present the variance decomposi-
tion defined in equation (25) and a graphical illustration of key relationships as implied
by estimation.
I use three criteria to evaluate the estimates:
a. The J-statistic test of the over-identifying restrictions.
b. Fulfillment of the convexity requirement for the costs function g.
c. The magnitude of implied total and marginal costs. As in many cases of invest-
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ment equations estimated in the q-literature, some specifications imply very high costs.
These are deemed to be unreasonable.
6.1 FOC Estimation
Table 8 reports the results of estimation. The table reports the point estimates and their
standard errors, Hansen’s (1982) J-statistic and its p-value, noting that some of the spec-
ifications estimated were also reported in Yashiv (2016). Table 9 shows the moments of
the estimated marginal costs series.
Tables 8 and 9
Row (a) examines a quadratic function (η1 = η2 = 2) with linear interactions (η31 =
η32 = 1).
8 Theweights on the different elements of the hiring process – vacancies, hiring
from non-employment, and hiring from other employment – are expressed by the fixed
parameters λ1 = 0.6,λ2 = 0.2, obtained after some experimentation. The parameters
estimated are the scale parameters (e1,e2, e31 and e32) of the frictions function (16) and
the labor share (α) of the production function (21). The J-statistic has a high p-value, the
parameters are precisely estimated, and the resulting g function fulfills all convexity
requirements; the estimate of α is around the conventional estimate of 0.66. Table 9
indicates very moderate costs estimates.
Row (b) takes up a very similar specification but ignores job to job flows, i.e., sets
λ2 = e32 = 0 and h2t = ψ
2
t = 0. This allows for the use of a much longer data sample –
1976:1-2013:4, with 152 quarterly observations. It too yields a J-statistic with a high p-
value, is, for the most part, precisely estimated, and the resulting g fulfills all convexity
requirements.
The two rows – (a) and (b) - yield similar results in terms of the implied costs re-
ported in Table 9. In particular, both feature negative coefficients for the interaction
terms, implying complementarity between hiring and investment.
Row (c) follows standard Tobin’s q type of models applied to the hiring of labor and
looks at a quadratic specification, ignoring the other factor of production (here ignoring
investment in capital). It thus sets η2 = 2, e1 = e31 = e32 = 0, i.e., has quadratic vacancy
and hiring costs, with no role for capital (see equation (17)). While there is no rejection
of the model, this specification implies very high, unreasonable costs, as seen in Table
9. This is reminiscent of the results in the literature on Tobin’q models for investment.
8See Yashiv (2016, section 4.3) for a discussion of other specifications.
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Row (d) reports the results of the standard (Pissarides-type) search and matching
model formulation with linear vacancy costs and no other arguments, as formulated in
equation (18), such that η2 = 1, e1 = e31 = e32 = λ1 = λ2 = 0. The emerging estimates
imply even higher costs (shown in Table 9) and the parameter α is estimated at a high
value (0.77).
To see these results in context note the following findings. Mortensen and Nagypal
(2006, page 30) note that “Although there is a consensus that hiring costs are important,
there is no authoritative estimate of their magnitude. Still, it is reasonable to assume
that in order to recoup hiring costs, the firm needs to employ a worker for at least two
to three quarters. When wages are equal to their median level in the standard model
(w = 0.983), hiring costs of this magnitude correspond to less than a week of wages.”
The widely-cited Shimer (2005) paper calibrates these costs at cq = 0.16 using a linear
cost function, which is equivalent to 3.4 weeks of wages. Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008) decompose this cost into two components: (i) the capital flow cost of posting a
vacancy; they compute it to be – in steady state – 47.4 percent of the average weekly
labor productivity; (ii) the labor cost of hiring one worker, which, relying on micro-
evidence, they compute to be 3 percent to 4.5 percent of quarterly wages of a new hire.
The first component would correspond to a figure of 0.037 here; the second component
would correspond to a range of 0.02 to 0.03 in the terms used here; together this implies
0.057 to 0.067 in current terms or around 1.1 to 1.3 weeks of wages. Blatter et al (2016)
survey the micro literature and report estimates of hiring costs ranging between 25%
and 131% of quarterly wages, i.e. between 3. 25 and 17 weeks of wages.
The estimates for the preferred specification, i.e., the GMM results reported in row
(a) of Table 8 and the first column of Table 9, pertain to marginal costs with a convex
costs function, while most of the above pertain to average costs, usually with a linear
function. The preferred specification here has an estimate of (1  τt) gvt
qt
ft
nt
which is 0.12
at its sample average; given that wtft
nt
= 0.62 on average, this is the equivalent of 2.5 weeks
of wages. In light of the cited numbers, this is at the low end of the range of macro and
micro estimates. The Tobin-q model and the standard model yield the equivalent of 19
and 20 weeks of wages, which are far above the estimates in the literature.
The estimates ofmarginal investment costs, implied by the preferred specification of
row (a) in Table 8, are on average
git
ft
kt
= 0.53. This estimate is equivalent to an addition
of 3% to the price of a unit of capital. In other words, for every dollar spent on the
marginal unit of capital purchased, the firm adds 3 cents in adjustment costs. This
result can be compared to the q-literature. One can divide the results in this literature
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into three sets: (i) the earlier studies, from the 1980s, suggested high costs, whereby
marginal costs range between 3 to 60 in the above terms (average output per unit of
capital) and the implied total costs range between 15% to 100% of output; (ii) more
recent studies which have reported moderate costs, whereby marginal costs are around
1 in the same terms of average output per unit of capital, and total costs range between
0.5% to 6% of output; (iii) micro-based studies, using cross-sectional or panel data,
which have reported low costs, with marginal costs at 0.04 to 0.50 of average output
per unit of capital and total costs range between 0.1% to 0.2% of output. The current
results are at the high end of the third, low-costs set.
In what follows I denote the results of row (a) as the preferred specification, noting
that row (b) yields a similar picture over a longer sample period. I focus on row (a) so
as to continue to take into account job to job flows, available only from 1994.
6.2 Post Estimation: Approximation and Variance Decomposition
Table 10 reports the results of the variance decomposition defined by equation (25)
following the approximation equation (23).9
Table 10
For the preferred specification, Table 10 shows that the key determinant of job value
volatility (denoted var(PVt)) is the last term, i.e., the sum of the co-variances of job val-
ues with future marginal profits
T
∑
j=1
(Ω)j 1 cov(PVt,MPt+j). Recall that marginal profits
MPt+j are net marginal productivity less the wage, i.e.,
 
1  τt+j
  
α  gnt+jft+j
nt+j
  wt+jft+j
nt+j
)
!
.
With the small variability of τt+j and
gnt+j
ft+j
nt+j
, the main driver of volatility are the future
labor shares wt+jft+j
nt+j
. All other terms in the decomposition play a very small role.
For the Tobin’q specification and for the standard search andmatchingmodel, Table
10 shows that there is some role in the variance decomposition also for the discount
rate, the productivity growth rate and the separation rate. Together they account for
about 20% of the variance of the approximated, truncated present value, as compared
to less than 2% in the preferred specification. This difference helps explain some further
implications of the estimates, discussed below.
9Experimentation with different values for the truncated horizon shows that starting with T = 30 there
is almost no change in the resulting PV (but as T rises the series is shortened). Hence the latter value was
chosen to be reported.
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6.3 Implications for Key Relationships
I look at the implications of the preferred specification for key relationships in the
model. One such relationship is that of vacancy rates ( vtnt ) with job values (
QNt
ft
nt
) and
investment rates ( itkt ). Using equation (12) and the estimates of row (a) in Table 8 this is
given by:
vt
nt
=
QNt
ft
nt
(q1t+q
2
t )
(1 τt)  
 
e31q1t + e32q
2
t
 it
kt
e2

(1  λ1   λ2) + λ1q1t + λ2q2t
2 (26)
This equation is plotted in Figure 6.10
Figure 6
This is a linear relationship, whereby labor recruiting, as expressed by the vacancy
rate, rises with job values and with the other firm activity – the capital investment rate.
In the following sections I look at the cyclical behavior and volatility of these three key
variables – vtnt ,
QNt
ft
nt
and itkt .
Another such relationship is the one between vacancy rates ( vtnt ) and the job filling
rates (q1t , q
2
t ) which the firm faces. These job-filling rates express the influence of match-
ing processes andmarket conditions, taken as given by the firm. This is shown in Figure
7.11
Figure 7
This is a non-linear relationship. The figure shows a non-trivial asymmetry: recruit-
ing ( vtnt ) falls as the job filling rate from non-employment (q
1
t ) rises, and rises as the job
filling rate from other firms (q2t ) rises. Why so? Each job filling rate has three effects.
One is to increase the job value,12thereby increasing the vacancy rate. A second is to
10The figure uses the sample averages of tax rates (τt) and job filling rates (q1t , q
2
t ) and employs the point
estimates of the preferred specification. The figure uses empirically-relevant ranges for vtnt , shown on the
vertical axis, and Q
N
t
ft
nt
and itkt , shown on the horizontal axes.
11The figure uses equation (26), the estimates of row (a) in Table 8, and the sample averages of τt,
QNt
ft
nt
and itkt
12Referring to the term
QNt
ft
nt
(q1t+q
2
t )
(1 τt) .
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reduce marginal costs via the interaction with the rate of investment,13 which also op-
erates to increase the vacancy rate. The third is a scale effect that raises marginal costs
for any given level of the vacancy rate.14 This third effect operates to lower the vacancy
rate. The estimation results of the preferred specification imply that the third effect
dominates in the case of the job filling rate from non-employment (q1t ) and that the first
two effects dominate in the case of the job filling rate from other firms (q2t ).
7 The Cyclicality of Job Values
Section 5 above has presented the cyclical properties of the key data series. This section
examines the cyclical properties of estimated job values in the different models.
Table 11 reports the cyclical behavior of estimated job values, using the point es-
timates of the LHS of equation (15), i.e., of marginal hiring costs, as reported in the
different specifications of Table 8. Figure 8 presents the time series plots of these mar-
ginal costs (with the left scale measuring the benchmark and constrained models and
the right scale the other two models).
Table 11 and Figure 8
The preferred specification (row (a) of Table 8) indicates counter-cyclicality, the con-
strained specification (row (b) of Table 8) weak counter-cyclicality, the Tobin’s q model
is weakly pro-cyclical (row (c) of Table 8), while the standard model (row (d) of Table
8) is strongly pro-cyclical.
Getting back to equation (1) the implications of these results are that they indicate
very different views of the cyclicality of job values.
Starting with the specification of row (d) in Table 8, the standard search and match-
ing (Pissarides-type)model, note that in its simple form the optimality equation is given
by (re-writing equation (18)):
(1  τt) e2qt = Et
"
ρt+1 (1  τt+1)
1
ft
nt

fnt+1   gnt+1   wt+1 + (1  ψt+1)
e2
qt+1
ft+1
nt+1
#
(27)
This equation has a pro-cyclical MCt on the LHS, as shown in Table 11 and Figure 8.
This is to be expected as it depends inversely on the matching rate qt = htvt , which itself
13Referring to the term    e31q1t + e32q2t  itkt , noting that e31, e32 < 0.
14Referring to the term e2

(1  λ1   λ2) + λ1q1t + λ2q2t
2
)
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is highly counter-cyclical.
The specification of row (c) in Table 8, the Lucas-Prescott/Tobin approach has mar-
ginal costs being weakly pro-cyclical, as seen in Table 11 and Figure 8. Repeating equa-
tion (17):
(1  τt) e2qt
"
(1  λ1   λ2)
+λ1q1t + λ2q
2
t
#2
vt
nt
= Et
1
ft
nt
"
ρt+1 (1  τt+1)
"
fnt+1   gnt+1   wt+1
+(1  ψt+1)
gvt+1
qt+1
##
(28)
The reason for the weak pro-cyclicality is that the pro-cyclicality of e2qt and of
vt
nt is
offset to some extent by the counter-cyclicality of q1t and q
2
t .
The preferred specification of row (a) in Table 8, implies the opposite. The results of
Table 11 and Figure 8 indicate counter-cyclicality. Note that this is a broader model. It
follows the Pissarides approach of using a vacancy creation equation but MCt depends
on all the relevant rates – h
1
t
nt ,
h2t
nt and
vt
nt . The equation here is:
(1  τt) 1qt
2664 e2
"
(1  λ1   λ2)
+λ1q1t + λ2q
2
t
#2
vt
nt
+(e31q1t + e32q
2
t )
it
kt
3775 = Et 1ft
nt
"
ρt+1 (1  τt+1)
"
fnt+1   gnt+1   wt+1
+(1  ψt+1)
gvt+1
qt+1
##
(29)
This model delivers counter-cyclicality on both sides of the equation, as the pro-
cyclicality of 1qt
vt
nt , and of (e31q
1
t + e32q
2
t )
it
kt is out-weighed by the counter-cyclical term
(1  λ1   λ2) + λ1q1t + λ2q2t
2 .
Note, two related points:
One is that it is of course not only the LHS of the hiring optimality equation which
differ across models, but also their RHS. In equations (27), (28) and (29) above, the
expressions
gvt+1
qt+1
differ across models. Note that Table 10 gave evidence of that in terms
of the variance decomposition.
The second is that all three models relate to the present value of marginal profits.
One can therefore ask what is the cyclical behavior of this latter present value, and why
do the models differ on this aspect. I examine this question in the next section.
In a recent paper, Kudlyak (2014) suggested a related concept she has termed “the
user cost” of labor. Comparing this concept to the current one, the following can be
shown. The user cost of labor is the sum of two terms:
(i) the first difference in job values, Q
N
t
ft
nt
,with proper discounting, what Kudlyak
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(2014, equation 4) calls UCVt .
(ii) a term that Kudlyak (2014, equation 2) callsUCWt and defines as (p.56): “the sum
of the hiring wage in period t and the expected present value of the differences between
wages paid from the next period onward in the employment relationship that starts in
t and the employment relationship that starts in t+ 1.”
Hence the job value is not the user cost of labor. Two crucial differences emerge
between Kudlyak (2014) and this paper:
a. The user costUCt is not the same concept as the job value and not even of its first
difference, as it includes an important other component, UCWt .
b. Kudlyak (2014) assumes constant discounting, constant separation, no produc-
tivity growth, no taxes, and no employment-dependent hiring costs.
This leads to the following key differences in the analysis:
a. The cyclicality of UCt should not be expected to be the same as the cyclicality of
QNt
ft
nt
, which is a key issue in the current paper.
b. The analysis of this paper assigns a role to variable discounting, separation and
productivity growth; Table 10 column 4 assigns 16% of the variance of the relevant
present value expression – within the framework of the standard search and matching
model – to those variables which are assumed constant in Kudlyak (2014).
Moreover, the above holds true for the restricted setting of the standard search and
matching model cost function which has e1 = e31 = e32 = 0,λ1 = λ2 = 0 and η2 = 1.
The main parts of the current paper deal with the preferred specification of hiring costs,
which are richer.
8 The Role of the Labor Share in Job Value Cyclicality
The labor share in GDP plays a key role in the afore-going results. It has also been
the focus of some attention in recent macroeconomic models of the business cycle. The
main reason for the key results of this paper is its cyclical behavior. The variance de-
composition of the approximated PVt, reported in Table 10 above, has shown that the
key role is played by marginal profits (repeating equation (24)):
MPt+j 
 
1  τt+j
0@α  gnt+jft+j
nt+j
  wt+jft+j
nt+j
)
1A (30)
As α is constant, the tax rate (τt+j) is fixed over long periods and the term
 gnt+1
ft+1
nt+1
is
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estimated to be small, the main driver is the labor share, wt+1ft+1
nt+1
.
Consider the cyclicality of the labor share. In Table 12, I present in panel (a) its
dynamic correlations with GDP. In panel (b), I present the dynamic correlations with
GDP of an approximated present value of these marginal profits (30), given by:15
PVt(MPt+s) =
T
∑
s=1
0@ 1
(1  ψt)
s
∏
i=1
ρt+i
ft+i
nt+i
ft+u 1
nt+i 1
(1  ψt+i 1)
1A (1  τt+s)
24α  wt+sft+s
nt+s
35 . (31)
Note that these dynamic correlations, for logged and HP filtered variables, are com-
puted using only data, with no parameter estimates.
Table 12
Noting the bolded numbers in panel (a) of the table, dynamically, the labor share is
pro-cyclical. As a result the job values it engenders are counter-cyclical. This counter-
cyclicality can be seen in panel (b), showing the dynamic correlations of the approxi-
mated job value expression in (31) with GDP. It is this dynamic stochastic behavior of
the labor share which is the key determinant of counter-cyclical job values.
Note that the different models examined in estimation capture this job value behav-
ior differentially, as seen in Section 7 above. There are several reasons for the differ-
ences across models: the relevant estimating equations, i.e., the empirical counter-parts
of equations (27), (28) and (29), use data from adjacent periods t and t+ 1 rather than T
period ahead data as in equation (31); the empirical equations use actual data variables,
not expected ones, and thus contain errors; and the models posit different parametric
forms of the cost function (g) and hence constrain the empirical equations in different
ways.
The point is that the preferred specification captures the counter-cyclicality of job
values shown in Table 12, while the Tobin and standard search and matching models
do not.
This cyclical behavior of the labor share has recently been noted by a number of
authors in other Macro contexts. The observation, whereby the labor share first falls in
a boom and subsequently rises for a substantial period of time, i.e., is dynamically pro-
cyclical, was discussed by Rios-Rull and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2010). Hall (2014) finds
15There are two aspects to this approximation: it ignores the
gnt+1
ft+1
nt+1
term and it truncates the infinite sum
at T.
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that the labor share is a-cyclical contemporaneously and pro-cyclical subsequently. Nekarda
and Ramey (2013) examine the cyclicality of mark-ups. Essentially they treat the mark-
up as the inverse of the labor share (see their equation 5), allowing various modifica-
tions to the relationship, such as overhead hours, CES production functions, and differ-
entials between marginal and average wages. Studying both aggregate and four-digit
manufacturing data of the U.S. economy, they find that mark-ups are contemporaneously
pro-cyclical and that dynamically they are counter-cyclical. The latter findingmeans that
if GDP is low now (recession), mark-ups will rise henceforth (see their Figure 2). This is
similar to the finding here that job values are counter-cyclical, i.e., that the present value
of profits rises in recessions. It is so for the same reason, namely that the future labor
share declines (i.e., again, dynamically the labor share is pro-cyclical). These findings
are not in contradiction with the findings of other recent papers, such as Haefke, Son-
ntag, and van Rens (2013), whereby the real wage wt itself is contemporaneously and
over some lags and leads pro-cyclical, as this is true for the current paper’s data.
Note that the current paper does not discuss a general equilibrium, structural model.
It focuses only on the FOC for firm optimal hiring and investment. Inter alia, it takes
wage share behavior as given. Therefore it does not attempt to explain the reasons for
the dynamic pro-cyclicality of the labor share. But such an explanation may be derived
from a structural DSGE setting. Thus, Rios-Rull and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2010) point
out that in RBC modelling, in order to account for this pattern of the data, one cannot
maintain the assumptions of Cobb Douglas production and competitive factor prices.
They point to labor search models as a potential modelling route. In those models,
a bargaining protocol for wages, combined with the FOC of the type examined here,
breaks the identity of wage and labor productivity behavior. In this set up, following
a positive productivity shock, the model may replicate the data: wages rise a bit and
then fall slowly, while the average product rises a lot and then monotonically declines;
consequently, the labor share first drops and then rises (see their Figure 6 on page 946).
A different modelling direction was proposed by Growiec, McAdam andMuc´kr (2015).
They find that in the medium-term the labor share is pro-cyclical, while in the short run
it is counter-cyclical. These findings are in line with the current findings. They then
offer explanations in terms of an endogenous, R&D-based growth model, with capital
and labor augmenting innovations.
Note, too, that the different models examined in estimation capture this job value
behavior differentially, as seen in Section 7 above. There are several reasons for the dif-
ferences across models: the relevant estimating equations, i.e., the empirical counter-
parts of the FOC equations of the three models use data from adjacent periods t and
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t+ 1 rather than T period ahead data as in equation (22); the empirical equations use
actual data variables, not expected ones, and thus contain errors; and the models posit
different parametric forms of the cost function (g) and hence constrain the empirical
equations in different ways. It is this last point which deserves emphasis. The standard
model places the following restrictions: e1 = e31 = e32 = 0,λ1 = λ2 = 0 and η2 = 1.
Tobin’s Q model places the restrictions e1 = e31 = e32 = 0 and η2 = 2. It turns out that
the data do not conform these restrictions. The preferred specification, which gives dif-
ferential weights to the different recruiting variables (unlike the standard model), and
allows for important interactions with investment (unlike the standard model and To-
bin’s model), fits the data better. It delivers a “different story,” whereby hiring and job
values are counter-cyclical, while the Tobin and standard search and matching models
do not, as shown in Table 11.
9 The Volatility of Recruitment Rates
The focus so far has been on the cyclicality of recruiting and of the associated job values.
In this section I turn to study the volatility of the key variables expressing recruitment
behavior, using the estimation results. In particular, I seek to explain the finding of high
volatility, which has been widely discussed in the literature, mostly following Shimer
(2005). The idea is to show that the estimated model not only explains co-movement
but is able also to account for high volatility. The connections of co-movement and
volatility are then explored.
I start by presenting some pertinent data moments. I then do variance decom-
positions of the vacancy rate, the total hiring rate, and the rate of hiring from non-
employment using the preferred estimates. I conclude by summarizing the findings
with respect to the determinants of the high volatility of these recruitment variables.
9.1 Data Moments
To fix ideas as to the volatility facts to be explained in this section, consider the follow-
ing data moments. Table 13a shows the volatility, in terms of the standard deviations,
of the key variables in firm behavior: the hiring rate – both the total one htnt and the rate
from non-employment h
1
t
nt , the vacancy rate
vt
nt , and the job filling rates q
1
t and q
2
t . I also
look at the investment rate itkt .
16 Table 13b presents the standard deviation and corre-
16The discussion here complements the discussion in Section 4 above. All variables are logged and
HP-filtered.
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lation of two key determinants: output (NFCB GDP, ft) and the job value (
QNt
(1 τt) ftnt
), as
estimated in Table 8 row (a). Table 13c reports the co-movement of the firm variables of
Table 13a and the two determinant variables examined in Table 13b.
Tables 13 a,b,c
These series are all shown in Figure 9 with the vertical lines indicating the start and
end of NBER-dated recessions.
Figure 9
The following points may be noted:
(i) The vacancy rate and the job filling rates are highly volatile. This a key point to
be explained.
(ii) The above rates are much more volatile than the hiring rates. Why so? Noting
that htnt = (q
1
t + q
2
t )
vt
nt , this is the result of the negative co-movement of vacancy rates
vt
nt
and job filling rates (q1t + q
2
t ).
(iii) Job values are much more volatile than output and are negatively correlated
with it, i.e., are countercyclical. The latter feature was emphasized above. In what
follows we shall see how this stochastic behavior accounts for volatility.
(iv) In terms of business cycle facts, the well-known moments shown here are the
pro-cyclicality of the investment rate and of the vacancy rate and the counter-cyclicality
of job filling rates. Much less known is the weak cyclicality of hiring rates, with the rate
of hiring from non-employment, actually being counter-cyclical, as discussed in Section
4 above.
(v) Job values have positive co-movementwith theworker flow fromnon-employment,
as expressed by the hiring rate h
1
t
nt and the job filling rate q
1
t . But they negatively co-move
with the decision variables of the firm – vacancy and investment rates. This feature,
too, plays a role in explaining volatility.
These moments suggest differential behavior of the various recruitment variables,
which I turn to analyze using variance decompositions.
9.2 The Vacancy Rate
As the analysis is somewhat involved, I break it down into sub-topics.
Deriving The Vacancy Rate in the Estimated Model. To explain the volatility of the
vacancy rate, I start off from the F.O.C:
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(1  τt) gvt
qt
ft
nt
=
QNt
ft
nt
Using the preferred estimates of Table 8 row (a) I get:
1
q1t + q
2
t
"
e2

(1  λ1   λ2) + λ1q1t + λ2q2t
2 vt
nt
+
 
e31q1t + e32q
2
t
 it
kt
#
=
QNt
(1  τt) ftnt
The vacancy rate can then be expressed as follows (basically re-writing equation
(26)):
vt
nt
=
QNt
(1 τt) ftnt
 
q1t + q
2
t

e2

(1  λ1   λ2) + λ1q1t + λ2q2t
2 (32)
 
 
e31q1t + e32q
2
t
 it
kt
e2

(1  λ1   λ2) + λ1q1t + λ2q2t
2
Equation (32) shows that the vacancy rate is composed of two terms:
(i) The job value Q
N
t
(1 τt) ftnt
, multiplied by a factor

(q1t+q2t )
e2[(1 λ1 λ2)+λ1q1t+λ2q2t ]
2

, which is
a non-linear function of the job filling rates q1t and q
2
t and model parameters (e2,λ1,λ2).
(ii) The investment rate itkt , multiplied by another factor

 (e31q1t+e32q2t )
e2[(1 λ1 λ2)+λ1q1t+λ2q2t ]
2

,
which is a (different) non-linear function of the job filling rates q1t and q
2
t and model
parameters (e2, e31, e32,λ1,λ2).
In other words, vacancy rates are driven by job values, and through the interaction
of costs, by investment rates, themselves driven by capital values.
Variance Decomposition of the Vacancy Rate. Table 14 reports the following variance
decomposition which ensues from equation (32):
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var(
vt
nt
) = var
0BB@
QNt
(1 τt) ftnt
 
q1t + q
2
t

e2

(1  λ1   λ2) + λ1q1t + λ2q2t
2
1CCA (33)
+var
  
e31q1t + e32q
2
t
 it
kt
e2

(1  λ1   λ2) + λ1q1t + λ2q2t
2
!
 2cov
0BB@
QNt
(1 τt) ftnt
 
q1t + q
2
t

e2

(1  λ1   λ2) + λ1q1t + λ2q2t
2 ,
 
e31q1t + e32q
2
t
 it
kt
e2

(1  λ1   λ2) + λ1q1t + λ2q2t
2
1CCA
Table 14
The table implies that by far the biggest part of the variance of vacancy rates can
be attributed to its second term, i.e., to investment rates itkt multiplied by the factor
delineated above. Note that this term becomes zero in the case of no interaction of
hiring costs and investment costs (e31 = e32 = 0).
The Co-Movement of the Constituents of the Vacancy Rate. In order to better understand
the significance of this breakdown, Table 15 shows correlations of these two terms, the
constituents of vacancy rates, with GDP ( ft) and with job values (
QNt
(1 τt) ftnt
), where all
variables have been logged and HP-filtered:
Table 15
Vacancy rates are pro-cyclical (0.91) and are negatively correlated ( 0.56) with job
values. This pro-cyclicality, as well as the negative correlation with job values, is very
much engendered by the correlations of the second term, the investment rate multiplied
by a factor, with GDP and with job values. In contrast, the first term determining the
vacancy rate, job values multiplied by a factor, is weakly pro-cyclical and has a positive,
rather than negative, correlation with job values.
The Determinants of High Vacancy Volatility. The second moments of the vacancy rate
are dominated by the interaction of hiring and investment costs. Note that investment
rates themselves are volatile and pro-cyclical, as reported in Tables 13 a and c above.
It is this vacancy rate which has been, together with the unemployment rate, at the
center of attention in the discussions of high labor market volatility following Shimer
(2005). The analysis here points to a volatility determinant which has received little, if
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any, attention previously: the capital investment rate, operating through the interaction
of investment and hiring costs.
I turn now to study the other two recruiting variables, total hiring and hiring from
non-employment, using a similar analysis.
9.3 The Total Hiring Rate
I analyze the behavior of the hiring rate in the same way. Note that the total hiring rate
ht
nt is given by:
ht
nt
=

q1t + q
2
t
 vt
nt
=
QNt
(1 τt) ftnt
 
q1t + q
2
t
2
e2

(1  λ1   λ2) + λ1q1t + λ2q2t
2 (34)
 
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t
 it
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
(1  λ1   λ2) + λ1q1t + λ2q2t
2
I repeat the same computations for hiring rates. The variance of hiring rate is given
by:
var(
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) = var
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e2
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(1  λ1   λ2) + λ1q1t + λ2q2t
2
1CCA
This yields the following decomposition in Table 16:
Table 16
The table implies that by far the bigger part of the variance of hiring rates can again
be attributed to its second term, i.e., investment rates itkt multiplied by a factor.
17This
17The factor is given by (
q1t+q
2
t )(e31q1t+e32q2t )
e2[(1 λ1 λ2)+λ1q1t+λ2q2t ]
2 , a non-linear function of the job filling rates q1t and q
2
t
and model parameters (e2, e31, e32,λ1,λ2).
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term, again, is zero in the case of no interaction of hiring costs and investment costs
(e31 = e32 = 0).
Table 17 shows the correlations of the two components of htnt with GDP ( ft) and with
job values ( Q
N
t
(1 τt) ftnt
), where all variables have been logged and HP-filtered:
Table 17
In this case hiring is just weakly related to GDP and to job values. Its two constituent
terms offset each other, hence the weak correlations.
9.4 The Rate of Hiring from Non-Employment
Turning now to a sub-set of total hiring, the hiring rate from non-employment, it is
given by:
h1t
nt
= q1t
vt
nt
=
QNt
(1 τt) ftnt
 
q1t + q
2
t

q1t
e2

(1  λ1   λ2) + λ1q1t + λ2q2t
2 (36)
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This yields the following decomposition in Table 18:
Table 18
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Here it is the first term, which depends on the job value, which plays the bigger role.
Table 19 shows the correlations of the two components of h
1
t
nt with GDP ( ft) and with
job values ( Q
N
t
(1 τt) ftnt
), where all variables have been logged and HP-filtered:
Table 19
The dominant role of the job value term is seen here by the correlation of the hiring
rate ( h
1
t
nt ) with it, 0.78, and by the fact that the hiring rate is counter-cyclical, following
the counter-cyclicality of job values.
Note that the results of Tables 18 and 19, where job values dominate, are almost
the opposite of the results of Tables 14 and 15 with respect to the vacancy rate and the
results of Tables 16 and 17 with respect to the total hiring rate, where the interaction
with investment rates dominates.
9.5 Summing Up
The key series pertaining to worker recruiting display substantially different behavior.
(i) For both the vacancy rate vtnt and the total hiring rate
ht
nt the following is found:
a. There are two determinants: the job value Q
N
t
(1 τt) ftnt
multiplied by a factor, and
the investment rate itkt multiplied by a different factor, with each factor being a function
of the job filling rates and model parameters. These factors are functions of market
conditions.
b. Much of the variance comes from the term which depends on the investment
rate, hence the interaction of hiring costs and investment costs is key.
c. Both are pro-cyclical due to the fact that the high pro-cyclicality of the investment
rate term dominates the counter-cyclicality of the job value term.
(ii) The hiring rate from non-employment h
1
t
nt behaves differently, almost the oppo-
site of the afore-going, and is counter-cyclical. It follows the behavior of job values, as
the Q
N
t
(1 τt) ftnt
term dominates.
Hence the volatility of vacancy and total hiring rates is driven by capital investment
behavior, while that of hiring from non-employment by the (different) behavior of job
values.
It is important to note that these conclusions point to two variables that got little
attention in the literature:
a. The job value, which is a present value, forward-looking variable that depends
on both productivity and wages; the literature tended to focus on the role of current
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productivity and the response of current wages to it.
b. The capital value, affecting volatility via the interaction of investment and hiring
costs, and coming into play via the investment rate term.
10 Explaining the Decline in Labor Market Fluidity
Recently, Davis and Haltiwanger (2014) have documented a decline over time in U.S.
labor market fluidity. They provide detailed evidence, in terms of both worker flows
and job flows (see, in particular, their Figures 1-10). In terms of the variables in the
current data set, this is manifested in the decline of h
1
n ,
h2
n ,ψ
1,ψ2 and vn , which can be
seen in Figure 10 for the full sample period (noting that job to job flows are measured
from 1994 only). The figure shows the raw data, not detrended.
Figure 10
The afore-going analysis can account for these facts too. Consider the following
equation derived from equation (12):
QNt
ft
nt
= (1  τt) gvt
q1t
ft
nt
(38)
Table 20 shows the estimated LHS and the RHS of equation (38) separately for two
sub-periods. As it is hard to pinpoint one particular year as the dividing line, some-
what arbitrarily the following sub-periods were examined: 1976-1995 and 1996-2013.
In order to cater for the longest sample period possible, the figure uses the preferred
estimates of row (b) in Table 8. It uses point estimates for the parameter values and the
estimated average job value Q
N
t
ft
nt
in each sub-sample. It also uses the data averages in
the sub-samples for the variables τt, q1t and
it
kt . Note that under this specification, which
omits job to job flows, the RHS of equation (38) is given by (omitting time sub-scripts
to denote averages):
(1  τ) gv
q1 fn
=
(1  τt)
q1t

e2

1  λ1 + λ1q1t
2 vt
nt
+ e3q1t
it
kt

(39)
= (1  τt)e3 itkt +
(1  τt)
q1t
e2

1  λ1 + λ1q1t
2 vt
nt
Table 20
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Figure 11 plots the LHS and RHS of equation (39) in the space of MC and PV on the
vertical axis and vacancy rates vn on the horizontal axis.
Figure 11
The table and the figure show that job values (Q
N
f
n
) – depicted as the horizontal
lines in the figure – declined somewhat going from the pre-1995 period to the post-1995
period. The upward sloping curve, expressing marginal costs ((1  τ) gv
q1 fn
), moved in a
counter-clockwise fashion. The changes in this latter curve are as follows: its intercept
(1  τt)e3 itkt declined as the tax rate fell and the investment rate increased, noting that
e3 < 0; its slope
(1 τt)
q1t
e2
 
1  λ1 + λ1q1t
2 went up with the rise in q1t and the fall in the
tax rate. The final outcome, shown in the intersection of the dashed lines marked ‘new’
as compared to the ‘old’ intersection, was that vacancy rates declined.
This analysis implies that the outcome of a lower vacancy rate, i.e., a decline in
recruiting activity, took place as the result of the rise in the investment rate, the fall in
the tax rate, and the rise in the job filling rate, all of which led to a movement of the
marginal costs curve in a counter-clockwise direction. In other words, vacancy rates
declined as job values went down and as the marginal cost curve became steeper.
11 Conclusions
The paper has provided a consistent picture of firm recruiting behavior in the U.S. First,
job values were found to be counter-cyclical, mainly because of labor share cyclical-
ity. The analysis has emphasized their forward-looking, present value aspect. Second,
and as a consequence, hiring from non-employment and the associated job-filling rate
are counter-cyclical. This behavior is consistent with known facts in the labor market.
These two points are different, though, from the conclusions of the standard search
and matching model. Third, the same framework can account for the pro-cyclicality of
vacancy rates and job to job flows; these stem from the important interaction of labor
recruiting behavior with capital investment behavior. Fourth, both the high volatility of
key recruiting variables at business cycle frequency and their declining secular trends
can be accounted for, using the same framework.
The paper has undertaken a partial equilibrium analysis. This type of analysis en-
ables it to avoidmis-specifications and empirical difficulties in other parts of the macro-
economy when studying the above issues. However, recruiting behavior of the type
studied here has wider implications, for example, for DSGE business cycle models. It
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is of interest to study them, in particular in light of the finding of counter-cyclical job
values and hiring from non-employment. In this vein, consider a recent discussion of
the role of wage cyclicality in these models. Basu and House (2016) and Bils, Klenow,
and Malin (2016) make the point that wages and Kudlyak’s (2014) user cost of labor
do not display much rigidity and are pro-cyclical. The former paper notes that mone-
tary business-cycle models lean heavily on price and wage rigidity. But while there is
substantial evidence that prices do not adjust frequently, there is much less evidence
of wage rigidity. Hence, the cyclical behavior of wages is important for business cycle
analysis, in particular for New Keynesian models. What are the analog repercussions
of the current paper, which focuses on the cyclical behavior of job values, rather than
wages? 18How would the counter-cyclical patterns found here be reflected in business
cycle models? This is the subject of a separate analysis I have undertaken (see Faccini
and Yashiv (2016)). The analysis embeds the current one in a New Keynesian DSGE
model, examining the effects of technology and monetary policy shocks. It turns out
that hiring costs of the type examined here offset the effects of price frictions in the pres-
ence of shocks. This interaction between hiring and price frictions is shown to generate
substantial and wide-ranging effects, which are delineated and explained in the cited
paper.
18The relations of job values with wages, via the labor share, were explored in Section 8, and with the
user cost in Section 7, showing that they follow very different cyclical behavior. Volatility and cyclicality
of all recruiting variables were well explained using these job values.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1
Alternative Formulations of The Recruiting Equation (1)
Linear Costs Models
paper firm size LHS, costs, arguments
1 Pissarides (2000, chapter 1) single job v, p
2 Pissarides (2000, chapter 2) single job v
3 Shimer (2005) single job v
4 Hall (2005) single job v
5 Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) single job v
6 Hall and Milgrom (2008) large v
7 Hagedron and Manovskii (2008) single job v : cKp+ cwpξ
8 Hall (2016) single job v
9 Christiano et al (2016) large hn
RHS, job value
f (production) w (wages) s (separation) ρ (discounting)
1 exo, stoch Nash exo, constant constant
2 exo, stoch Nash endo, stoch constant
3 exo, stoch Nash exo, stoch constant
4 exo, stoch sticky exo, constant constant
5 exo, stoch Nash /rigid/Calvo exo, constant constant
6 exo, stoch alternating offers exo, constant constant
7 exo, stoch Nash exo, constant constant
8 exo, stoch Nash/alternating offers exo, constant from stock market
9 ht = lt alternating offers exo, constant GE, IMRS
i
Convex Costs Models
paper size LHS, costs, arguments
arguments function
1 Merz and Yashiv (2007) large hn ,
i
k , f linear-convex
2 Gertler and Trigari (2009) large hn quadratic
3 Gali (2011) large hu power
4 Acemoglu and Hawkins (2014) large v convex
RHS, job value
f (production) w (wages) s (separation) ρ (discounting)
1 eztnαt k
1 α
t exo, stoch exog, stoch WACC
2 ztnαt k
1 α
t Nash, Calvo exo, constant GE, IMRS
3 AtN1 αt Nash, Calvo exo, constant GE, IMRS
4 y(n; z) Intrafirm bargaining exo, constant constant
Notes:
1. The table presents components of the recruiting equations in key papers, spelled
out in full in Appendix A. These equations all have recruiting costs on their left hand
side (LHS) and some measure of job value on their right hand side (RHS).
2. Abbrevations used:
exo=exogenous
endo=endogenous
stoch= stochastic
v=vacancies, h=hires, n=employment, p=productivity
GE=General Equilibrium
IMRS=Intertemporal Rate of Substitution
WACC=Weighted Average Cost of Capital
ii
Table 2
Co-Movement of Hiring Rates from Non Employment ( h
1
t
nt ) and GDP ( ft)
logged, HP-filtered
Cross-Correlations
ρ(
h1t
nt , ft+i)
i  8  4  1 0 1 4 8
 0.15  0.35  0.39  0.30  0.15 0.11 0.23
Figure 1: Cyclicality of the hiring rate from non-employment h
1
t
nt
Notes:
1. NBER-dated recessions are shaded.
2. The blue line is GDP, ft in terms of the model; the red line is the rate of hiring
from non-employment, h
1
t
nt in the model
iii
Table 3
Co-Movement of Hiring Rates from Employment (job to job flows, h
2
t
nt ) and GDP ( ft)
logged, HP-filtered
Cross-Correlations
ρ(
h2t
nt , ft+i)
i  8  4  1 0 1 4 8
 0.13 0.26 0.64 0.68 0.66 0.28  0.05
Figure 2: Cyclicality of the hiring rate from other employment h
2
t
nt
Notes:
1. NBER-dated recessions are shaded.
2. The blue line is GDP, ft in terms of the model; the red line is the rate of hiring
from other employment, h
2
t
nt in the model. Data are available only from 1994.
Table 4
Co-Movement of Vacancy Rates ( vtnt ) and GDP ( ft)
iv
logged, HP-filtered
Cross-Correlations
ρ( vtnt , ft+i)
i  8  4  1 0 1 4 8
 0.26 0.29 0.82 0.89 0.83 0.39  0.13
Figure 3: Cyclicality of vacancy rates vtnt
Notes:
1. NBER-dated recessions are shaded.
2. The blue line is GDP, ft in terms of the model; the red line is the vacancy rate, vtnt
in the model.
v
Table 5
Total Hiring Flows (NSA, 000s)
Moments
Sample: 2001 : 1  2014 : 06
CPS JOLTS
Mean 8, 595 4, 698
Median 8, 609 4, 765
Std. Dev. 496 484
C.O.V 0.06 0.10
Skewness 0.25  0.25
Kurtosis 2.42 2.14
Table 6
Stochastic Behavior of the Gross Hiring Rate
and Other Labor Market Variables
Co-Movement (contemporaneous correlation) with GDP
logged, HP filtered
h1t
nt
h1t
ut+ot
ut+ot
popt
1
nt
popt
 0.25 0.53  0.72  0.82
Notes:
1. h
1
t
nt is the rate of hiring from non-employment.
2. h
1
t
ut+ot is the job-finding rate.
3. ut+otpopt is the non-employment rate.
4. 1nt
popt
is the inverse employment rate (out of working age population).
vi
Table 7
Descriptive Sample Statistics
Quarterly, U.S. data
a. 1976:1-2013:4 (n = 152)
Variable fk τ
i
k δ
wn
f
h1
n
v
n ψ
1 β
Mean 0.14 0.38 0.024 0.02 0.62 0.126 0.031 0.125 0.99
Standard Deviation 0.01 0.05 0.003 0.003 0.02 0.010 0.007 0.010 0.005
b. 1994:1-2013:4 (n = 80)
Variable fk τ
i
k δ
wn
f
h
n =
h1+h2
n
v
n ψ = ψ
1 + ψ2
Mean 0.15 0.34 0.026 0.02 0.61 0.178 0.028 0.178
Standard Deviation 0.01 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.03 0.012 0.005 0.012
β
Mean 0.99
Standard Deviation 0.005
Notes:
All variables are defined in Section 4.1 and in Appendix C.
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Figure 4: Gross and Net Worker Flows Rates
Notes:
1. The graph labeled h1/N shows the hiring rate from non-employment h
1
t
nt .
2. The graph labeled psy1 shows the separation rate from employment to non-
employment ψ1t .
3. The graph labeled net emp rate of change shows the rate of change of the stock
of employment nt nt 1‘nt 1 . NBER-dated recessions are shaded.
viii
Figure 5: Hiring and separation rates, to and from non-employment
Notes:
1. The series labeled h1/N shows the hiring rate from non-employment h
1
t
nt .
2. The series labeled psy1 shows the separation rate from employment to non-
employment ψ1t .
3. Both series are logged and HP-filtered. NBER-dated recessions are shaded.
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Table 8
GMM Estimates
specification e1 e2 e31 e32 α J-Statistic
a benchmark 77.3 9.1  2.8  19.6 0.66 51.6
(6.3) (1.0) (1.2) (0.9) (0.003) (0.74)
b constrained case 32.2 2.3  1.5   0.65 83.9
λ1 = 0.9;λ2 = 0 (6.4) (0.4) (0.9)   (0.30)
1976  2013
c Tobin’s q for N 0 30.8 0 0 0.70 61.9
  (0.9)     (0.003) (0.48)
d Standard matching model 0 9.3 0 0 0.77 62.5
η2 = 1,λ1 = λ2 = 0   (0.1)     (0.002) (0.46)
Notes:
1. The tables report point estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The J-
statistic is reported with p value in parentheses.
2. The following parameter values are set unless indicated otherwise: λ1 = 0.6;λ2 =
0.2; η1 = η2 = 2, η31 = η32 = 1.
3. The sample period is 1994:1 – 2013:4, except for Row b where it is 1976:1-2013:4.
x
Table 9
Estimated Marginal Costs – Data Moments
1994 : 1  2013 : 4
benchmark constrained Tobin’s Q for N Std matching model
mean 0.12 0.13 0.90 0.97
median 0.12 0.13 0.89 1.00
std. 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.13
auto-correlation 0.91 0.80 0.55 0.92
Notes:
1. The series in the table are the LHS of the estimated equation (reported in Table 8)
namely (1  τt) gvt
qt
ft
nt
.
2. The sample period is 1994:1 – 2013:4, except for column “constrained” where it is
1976:1-2013:4.
xi
Table 10
Variance Decomposition (T = 30)
1 2 3 4
benchmark constrained Tobin’s q Std model
var(PVt,T) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
ΩrΩ f E(MP)
1 Ω
T
∑
j=1
(Ω)j 1cov(Pt,grt+j)
var(PVt,T)
0.04 0.01 0.09 0.07
ΩrΩ f E(MP)
1 Ω
T
∑
j=1
(Ω)j 1cov(Pt,g
f
t+j)
var(PVt,T)
 0.02  0.001 0.04 0.03
ΩrΩ f E(MP)
1 Ω
T
∑
j=2
(Ω)j 1cov(Pt,gst+j)
var(PVt,T)
 0.007 0.07 0.06 0.06
ΩrΩ f
T
∑
j=1
(Ω)j 1cov(Pt,MPt+j)
var(PVt,T)
0.74 0.60 0.78 0.62
residual 0.24 0.32 0.02 0.21
Notes:
1. See Section 6.2 for a discussion and Appendix E for full details of the decomposi-
tion.
2. The four specifications follow the estimates of Table 8.
3. The basic decomposition equation is:
var(PVt) = Ω
rΩ fE(MP)
1 Ω
T
∑
j=1
(Ω)j 1 cov(PVt, grt+j) +
ΩrΩ fE(MP)
1 Ω
T
∑
j=1
(Ω)j 1 cov(PVt, g
f
t+j) +
ΩrΩ fE(MP)
1 Ω
T
∑
j=2
(Ω)j 1 cov(PVt, gst+j) +
ΩrΩ f
T
∑
j=1
(Ω)j 1 cov(PVt,MPt+j)
xii
Figure 6: Estimated Relationships of Recruitment ( vtnt ), Job Values (
QNt
ft
nt
), and
Investment Rates ( itkt )
xiii
Figure 7: Estimated Relationships of Recruitment ( vtnt ) and Job Filling Rates (q
1
t , q
2
t )
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Figure 8: Job Values Estimates Across Models
Notes:
1. Benchmark refers to the preferred specification of Table 8, row (a). Constrained
refers to the specification of Table 8, row (b). Their values are given on the left axis. See
the corresponding columns in Table 9.
2. Tobin’s q and standard model refer to the specifications of Table 8, rows (c)
and (d), respectively. Their values are given on the right axis. See the corresponding
columns in Table 9.
3. NBER-dated recessions are shaded.
xv
Table 11
Job Value Cyclicality
Cross-Correlations of LHS of the Vacancy Optimality Equation with GDP
(1  τt) gvtqt = Et
"
ρt+1 (1  τt+1)
"
fnt+1   gnt+1   wt+1
+(1  ψt+1)
gvt+1
qt+1
##
ρ(LHSt, ft+i)
HP filtered (λ = 1600)
Benchmark Model
i  8  4  1 0 1 4 8
y  0.04  0.46  0.67  0.63  0.49 0.04 0.33
Constrained Case
i  8  4  1 0 1 4 8
y 0.04  0.29  0.38  0.29  0.14 0.21 0.32
Tobin’s q
i  8  4  1 0 1 4 8
y  0.28  0.24 0.03 0.13 0.27 0.41 0.19
Standard Model
i  8  4  1 0 1 4 8
y  0.26 0.38 0.85 0.90 0.79 0.39  0.18
Notes:
This equation is equation (15) in the text.
xvi
Table 12
The Labor Share, Approximated Job Values and GDP
Cross-Correlations
logged, HP filtered (λ = 1600)
a. ρ(ft,
wt+i
ft+i
nt+i
)
i  8  4  1 0 1 4 8
 0.36  0.38  0.29  0.23  0.02 0.53 0.46
b. ρ(ft,PVt+i(MP))
PVt(MPt+s) =
T
∑
s=1
0@ 1
(1  ψt)
s
∏
i=1
ρt+i
ft+i
nt+i
ft+u 1
nt+i 1
(1  ψt+i 1)
1A (1  τt+s)
24α  wt+sft+s
nt+s
35 .
i  8  4  1 0 1 4 8
0.45  0.07  0.47  0.54  0.54  0.39  0.15
Notes:
a. Panel a shows dynamic correlations between the labor share wt+ift+i
nt+i
and GDP ft.
b. Panel b shows dynamic correlations between the approximated job value given
byPVt(MPt+s) and GDP ft.
c. There are two aspects to the approximation in PVt : it ignores the
gnt+1
ft+1
nt+1
term in the
optimality equation (15) and it truncates the infinite sum at T.
xvii
Table 13a
Volatility of Recruiting Variables
std
it
kt 0.07
q1t 0.12
q2t 0.08
vt
nt 0.11
ht
nt 0.02
h1t
nt 0.02
Table 13b
Moments of the Determinants of Recruitment
ft
QNt
(1 τt) ftnt
std 0.02 0.12
ρ  0.63
Table 13c
Co-Movement of Recruiting Variables
ρ(row,column) ft
QNt
(1 τt) ftnt
it
kt 0.87  0.83
q1t  0.89 0.67
q2t  0.79 0.39
vt
nt 0.91  0.56
ht
nt 0.27 0.15
h1t
nt  0.28 0.78
Notes:
1. All series are logged and HP-filtered.
2. QNt is computed using the point estimates of row (a) in Table 8.
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Figure 9: Key Data Series for the Cyclical Analysis
Notes:
1.The series shown are GDP ( ft), job value (QNt , computed using the point estimates
of row (a) in Table 8), total hiring rate H/N ( htnt ), hiring rate from non-employment
H1/N ( h
1
t
nt ), job filling rate from non-employment (q
1
t ), job filling rate from other em-
ployment (q2t ), the vacancy rate V/N (
vt
nt ), and the investment rate I/K (
it
kt ).
2. All series are logged and HP-filtered.
3. NBER-dated recessions are shown betwen the vertical lines.
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Table 14: Variance Decomposition: The Vacancy Rate
variance relative to var( vtnt )
var( vtnt ) 2.3  10 5 1
var
0B@ Q
N
t
(1 τt)
ft
nt
(q1t+q2t )
e2[(1 λ1 λ2)+λ1q1t+λ2q2t ]
2
1CA 2.7  10 6 0.12
var

(e31q1t+e32q2t )
it
kt
e2[(1 λ1 λ2)+λ1q1t+λ2q2t ]
2

2.5  10 5 1.08
cov
0B@ Q
N
t
(1 τt)
ft
nt
(q1t+q2t )
e2[(1 λ1 λ2)+λ1q1t+λ2q2t ]
2 ,
(e31q1t+e32q2t )
it
kt
e2[(1 λ1 λ2)+λ1q1t+λ2q2t ]
2
1CA 2.4  10 6 0.11
Table 15
Co-Movement: The Vacancy Rate
ρ

vt
nt , ft

0.91
ρ
0B@ Q
N
t
(1 τt)
ft
nt
(q1t+q2t )
e2[(1 λ1 λ2)+λ1q1t+λ2q2t ]
2 , ft
1CA 0.26
ρ

 (e31q1t+e32q2t ) itkt
e2[(1 λ1 λ2)+λ1q1t+λ2q2t ]
2 , ft

0.92
ρ

vt
nt ,
QNt
(1 τt) ftnt

 0.56
ρ
0B@ Q
N
t
(1 τt)
ft
nt
(q1t+q2t )
e2[(1 λ1 λ2)+λ1q1t+λ2q2t ]
2 ,
QNt
(1 τt) ftnt
1CA 0.49
ρ

 (e31q1t+e32q2t ) itkt
e2[(1 λ1 λ2)+λ1q1t+λ2q2t ]
2 ,
QNt
(1 τt) ftnt

 0.77
Notes:
1. The vacancy rate variance decomposition is discussed and explained in Section
9. The bottom two tables show the correlations of the vacancy rate and its components
with GDP and the intra-correlations.
2. All series are logged and HP-filtered. QNt is computed using the point estimates
of row (a) in Table 8.
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Table 16
Variance Decomposition: The Total Hiring Rate
variance relative to var( htnt )
var( htnt ) 1.5  10 4 1
var
0B@ Q
N
t
(1 τt)
ft
nt
(q1t+q2t )
2
e2[(1 λ1 λ2)+λ1q1t+λ2q2t ]
2
1CA 1.8  10 4 1.19
var

(q1t+q2t )(e31q1t+e32q2t )
it
kt
e2[(1 λ1 λ2)+λ1q1t+λ2q2t ]
2

4.4  10 4 2.90
cov
0B@ Q
N
t
(1 τt)
ft
nt
(q1t+q2t )
2
e2[(1 λ1 λ2)+λ1q1t+λ2q2t ]
2 ,
(q1t+q2t )(e31q1t+e32q2t )
it
kt
e2[(1 λ1 λ2)+λ1q1t+λ2q2t ]
2
1CA 2.3  10 4 1.55
Table 17
Co-Movement: The Total Hiring Rate
ρ

ht
nt , ft

0.27
ρ
0B@ Q
N
t
(1 τt)
ft
nt
(q1t+q2t )
2
e2[(1 λ1 λ2)+λ1q1t+λ2q2t ]
2 , ft
1CA  0.65
ρ

 (q1t+q2t )(e31q1t+e32q2t ) itkt
e2[(1 λ1 λ2)+λ1q1t+λ2q2t ]
2 , ft

0.82
ρ

ht
nt ,
QNt
(1 τt) ftnt

0.15
ρ
0B@ Q
N
t
(1 τt)
ft
nt
(q1t+q2t )
2
e2[(1 λ1 λ2)+λ1q1t+λ2q2t ]
2 ,
QNt
(1 τt) ftnt
1CA 0.99
ρ

 (q1t+q2t )(e31q1t+e32q2t ) itkt
e2[(1 λ1 λ2)+λ1q1t+λ2q2t ]
2 ,
QNt
(1 τt) ftnt

 0.86
Notes:
Same as for Tables 14 and 15; except that the bottom two tables pertian to the total
hiring rate and its components.
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Table 18
Variance Decomposition: The Hiring Rate (from non-employment)
variance relative to var( h
1
t
nt )
var( h
1
t
nt ) 1.2  10 5 1
var
0B@ Q
N
t
(1 τt)
ft
nt
(q1t+q2t )q1t
e2[(1 λ1 λ2)+λ1q1t+λ2q2t ]
2
1CA 1.4  10 4 11.4
var

q1t (e31q1t+e32q2t )
it
kt
e2[(1 λ1 λ2)+λ1q1t+λ2q2t ]
2

9.3  10 5 7.6
cov
0B@ Q
N
t
(1 τt)
ft
nt
(q1t+q2t )q1t
e2[(1 λ1 λ2)+λ1q1t+λ2q2t ]
2 ,
q1t (e31q1t+e32q2t )
it
kt
e2[(1 λ1 λ2)+λ1q1t+λ2q2t ]
2
1CA 1.1  10 4 9.0
Table 19
Co-Movement: The Hiring Rate (from non-employment)
ρ

h1t
nt , ft

 0.28
ρ
0B@ Q
N
t
(1 τt)
ft
nt
(q1t+q2t )q1t
e2[(1 λ1 λ2)+λ1q1t+λ2q2t ]
2 , ft
1CA  0.68
ρ

 q1t (e31q1t+e32q2t ) itkt
e2[(1 λ1 λ2)+λ1q1t+λ2q2t ]
2 , ft

0.84
ρ

h1t
nt ,
QNt
(1 τt) ftnt

0.78
ρ
0B@ Q
N
t
(1 τt)
ft
nt
(q1t+q2t )q1t
e2[(1 λ1 λ2)+λ1q1t+λ2q2t ]
2 ,
QNt
(1 τt) ftnt
1CA 0.997
ρ

 q1t (e31q1t+e32q2t ) itkt
e2[(1 λ1 λ2)+λ1q1t+λ2q2t ]
2 ,
QNt
(1 τt) ftnt

 0.84
Notes:
Same as for Tables 14 and 15; except that the bottom two tables pertian to the hiring
rate from non-employment and its components.
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Figure 10: The Secular Decline in Worker Flows and Vacancy Rates
Notes:
1.The series shown are the hiring rate from non-employment H1/N ( h
1
t
nt ), hiring
rate from other employment H2/N ( h
2
t
nt ), the separation rate from employment to non-
employment psy1 (ψ1t ), the flow rate from employment to other employment psy2
(ψ2t ),and the vacancy rate V/N (
vt
nt ).
2. All series are raw data, not filtered.
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Table 20
Decline in Labor Market Fluidity (Section 10)
QNt
ft
nt
= (1  τ) gv
q1 fn
= (1  τt)e3 itkt +
(1  τt)
q1t
e2

1  λ1 + λ1q1t
2 vt
nt
Data Averages
1976:1-1995:4 1996:1-2013:4
vt
nt 0.035 0.028
τt 0.41 0.34
q1t 4.0 4.4
it
kt 0.022 0.026
Parameter Point Estimates
e2 2.3
e3  1.5
λ1 0.9
Job Value Estimates
1976:1-1995:4 1996:1-2013:4
QNt
ft
nt
0.135 0.126
Figure 11: Job Values and Marginal Costs Across Sub-Periods
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